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Two weeks that changed the world: The events of September 11 through Sept 25th Within hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, members of the Bush administration began to look for evidence that Iraq was somehow tied to the attacks. When they were notified that Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were responsible, they still insisted that some sort of Iraqi connection had to be present. In the two weeks that followed decisions were made at the highest levels that would ensure that the path to war would lead to Baghdad. By the end of the second week, the Pentagon was working on war plans, a legal justification was found for pre-emptive war against Saddam and a public relations campaign begun, all before the fires of the attacks had been extinguished. |
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| 8:46 a.m. Flight 11 Hits the North Tower of the World Trade Center Between 8:55-9:00 a.m. Bush First Told About WTC Crash?; Suggests Accident 9:03 a.m. Flight 175 Crashes into WTC South Tower 9:06 a.m. Bush Told WTC Hit Again and America's Under Attack; He Continues Photo-Op 9:06-9:16 a.m. Bush Reads Pet Goat Story 9:29 a.m. President Bush Makes a Scheduled Speech; Proclaims Terrorist Attack on Our Country 9:34 a.m. Bush Leaves Booker Elementary School for Sarasota Airport 9:37 a.m. Flight 77 Crashes into Reinforced Section of the Pentagon 9:43 a.m. Bush Learns of Attack on Pentagon as Motorcade Reaches Sarasota Airport 9:56 a.m.Air Force One Gets Airborne 9:59 a.m. South Tower of WTC Collapses (1) |
9:59 a.m. Richard Clarke Told Some Hijackers Have al-Qaeda Connections
FBI counterterrorism chief, Dale Watson tells Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke privately that, “We got the passenger
manifests from the airlines. We recognize some names, Dick. They're al-Qaeda.” When Clarke then questions him as to how they got
on board. Watson reples, “Hey, don't shoot the messenger, friend. CIA forgot to tell us about them.” Some hijacker names,
including Mohamed Atta's, were identified on a reservations computer over an hour earlier. Clarke, 2004, pp 13-14
FBI counterterrorism chief, Dale Watson tells Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke privately that, “We got the passenger
manifests from the airlines. We recognize some names, Dick. They're al-Qaeda.” When Clarke then questions him as to how they got
on board. Watson reples, “Hey, don't shoot the messenger, friend. CIA forgot to tell us about them.” Some hijacker names,
including Mohamed Atta's, were identified on a reservations computer over an hour earlier. Clarke, 2004, pp 13-14
| After 9:59 a.m. Clarke Orders Securing of Buildings, Harbors, and Borders 10:03-10:10 a.m. Flight 93 Crashes; Seven-Minute Discrepancy on Exact Timing of Crash 10:10 a.m. Military Put on High Alert 10:28 a.m. WTC North Tower Collapses 11:45 a.m. Air Force One Lands at Louisiana Air Force Base (1) |
Sometime after attacks Bush Speculates about Iraq
President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein's regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had
been an enemy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in
ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some
of the piloting, especially Hanjour's high-speed dive into the Pentagon. He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide
terrorists as well. Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President told us he also thought about
Iran. 9-11 Commission Report
12:05 p.m.: Rumsfeld Finds Evidence of al-Qaeda Role Not Good Enough
CIA Director Tenet tells Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about an intercepted phone call from earlier in the day at 9:53 a.m. An al-
Qaeda operative talked of a fourth target just before Flight 93 crashed. Rumsfeld wrote notes to himself at the time. According
to CBS, “Rumsfeld felt it was ‘vague,’ that it ‘might not mean something,’ and that there was ‘no good basis for hanging hat.’ In
other words, the evidence was not clear-cut enough to justify military action against bin Laden.” [CBS News, 9/4/02]
1:30 p.m. Air Force One Leaves Louisiana; Flies to Nebraska
2:40 p.m. Rumsfeld Wants to Blame Iraq
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is provided information from the CIA indicating that three of the hijackers were suspected al-Qaeda
operatives. Notes composed by aides who were with Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center on 9/11 are leaked nearly
a year later. According to the notes, information shows, “One guy is [an] associate of [USS] Cole bomber.” (This is a probable
reference to Khalid Almihdhar or Nawaf Alhazmi.) Rumsfeld has also been given information indicating an al-Qaeda operative had
advanced details of the 9/11 attack. According to the aide's notes, Rumsfeld wants the “best info fast. Judge whether good
enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]. Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and
not.” [ CBS News, 9/4/02]
2:50 p.m. Bush Arrives in Nebraska; Enters Strategic Command Center
3:15 President Bush meets with his principal advisers through video teleconference. Tenet says evidence
points to Al Qaeda
Rice said President Bush began the meeting with the words, "We're at war," and that Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet said the agency was still assessing who was responsible, but the early signs all pointed to al Qaeda. 9-11 Commission Report
4:33 p.m. Air Force One Leaves Nebraska; Heads towards Washington
5:20 p.m. WTC Building 7 Collapses; Cause Remains Unclear
6:54 p.m. Bush Returns to White House
Evening of 9-11 General Wesley Clark says White House pressured him to blame Iraq for attacks
"Well, it came from the White House, it came from people around the White House. It came from all over. I got a call on 9/11. I
was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, 'You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to
be connected to Saddam Hussein.' I said, 'But--I'm willing to say it, but what's your evidence?' And I never got any evidence." Meet
the Press published 6-15-2003
Evening of 9-11 Richard Perle claims Attacks linked to "one or more large governments"
"This could not have been done without help of one or more governments," Perle told The Washington Post on Sep. 11. "Someone
taught these suicide bombers how to fly large airplanes. I don't think that can be done without the assistance of large
governments." Inter press services 7-15-2003
Evening of 9-11 Ex CIA Chief James Woolsly and Neocon William Kristol blame Iraq for attacks on numerous TV
interviews
”[I]t's not impossible that terrorist groups could work together with the government...the Iraqi government has been quite
closely involved with a number of Sunni terrorist groups and -- on some matters -- has had direct contact with (Osama) bin
Laden,” [Woolsey] told one anchorman in a series of at least half a dozen national television appearances on Sep. 11 and 12.
That same evening, Kristol echoed Woolsey on National Public Radio. ”I think Iraq is, actually, the big, unspoken sort of elephant
in the room today. There's a fair amount of evidence that Iraq has had very close associations with Osama bin Laden in the past, a
lot of evidence that it had associations with the previous effort to destroy the World Trade Center (in 1993). Inter press services
7-15-2003
Late Night 9-11 Bush calls meeting of "War Council", Rumsfeld wonders how much evidence is needed to deal
with Iraq
This group usually included Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General
Hugh Shelton, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (later to become chairman) General Myers, DCI Tenet, Attorney General
Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. From the White House staff, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Chief of
Staff Card were part of the core group, often joined by their deputies, Stephen Hadley and Joshua Bolten.
In this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it was a time for self-defense. The United States would
punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks, but also those who harbored them. Secretary Powell said the United States had
to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arab states that the time to act was now. He said we would need to build a
coalition. The President noted that the attacks provided a great opportunity to engage Russia and China. Secretary Rumsfeld
urged the President and the principals to think broadly about who might have harbored the attackers, including Iraq,
Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. He wondered aloud how much evidence the United States would need in order to deal with
these countries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble. 9-11 Commission Report
|
Sept 12: Second meeting of NSC, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz push for war with Iraq according to terrorist tsar Clarke
"I expected to go back to a round of meetings [after September 11] examining what the next attacks could be, what our
vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq. At
first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting Al Qaeda. Then I realized with almost a sharp
physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda
about Iraq." “They were talking about Iraq on 9/11. They were talking about it on 9/12.” "Against all Enemies" pg 30 , Richard
Clarke 3-1-04
Sept 12: NSC Meeting centers around Iraq invasion
Powell agrees with Clarke that the immediate focus should be al-Qaeda. However, Powell also says, “Public opinion has to be
prepared before a move against Iraq is possible.” Clarke complains to him, “Having been attacked by al-Qaeda, for us now to go
bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.” President Bush notes
the goal should be replacing the Iraqi government, not just bombing it, but the military warns an invasion would need a large force
and many months to assemble. Rumsfeld's view is said to be closely aligned with that of his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who believes
Saddam, not Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda, should be the principal target of the “war on terrorism.”
"Bush at War" Bob Woodward,pg 49 2002
"Against all Enemies" pg 31 Richard Clark 3-1-04
Sept 12: Rumsfeld says Iraq is better "target" than Afghanistan
During the NSC meeting the topic if Afghanistan is discussed. "Secretary Rumsfeld complained that there were no decent targets
for bombing in Afghanistan and that we should consider bombing Iraq, which, he said, had better targets."
"Against all Enemies" pg 31 Richard Clark 3-1-04
Sept 12: Bush tells Clarke to go back and look again for Iraq link to attacks
"On September 12th, I left the video conferencing center and there, wandering alone around the situation room, was the
president. He looked like he wanted something to do. He grabbed a few of us and closed the door to the conference room.
"Look," he told us, "I know you have a lot to do and all, but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything.
See if Saddam did this. See if he's linked in any way."
I was once again taken aback, incredulous, and it showed. "But, Mr. President, Al Qaeda did this."
"I know, I know, but - see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred..."
"Against all Enemies" pg 30 , Richard Clarke 3-1-04
Sept 13: Ex-CIA Chief, and leading Neocon, James Woolsly publishes op-ed calling for an examination into Iraqi
ties to both 9-11 and 1993 WTC bombings
"If this theory is correct, he says, “then it was Iraq that went after the World Trade Center last time. Which makes it much more
plausible that Iraq has done so again.” In light of this, he argues, US authorities should consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein
had a hand in the 9/11 attacks. “[I]intelligence and law enforcement officials investigating the case would do well to at least
consider another possibility: that the attacks—whether perpetrated by bin Laden and his associates or by others—were sponsored,
supported, and perhaps even ordered by Saddam Hussein,” he writes. “As yet, there is no evidence of explicit state sponsorship of
the September 11 attacks. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” "New Republic" 9-13-2001, "Daily Telegraph" 9-17-01
Sept 15: At Camp David Meeting Wolfowitz lobbies for war with Iraq
Saturday, September 15, President Bush gathered his closest advisers at Camp David to discuss the shape of the coming war. Much
of their discussion dealt with Afghanistan. But during a session that morning, according to Bob Woodward's 2002 book, Bush at War,
Wolfowitz advocated an attack on Iraq, perhaps even before an attack on Afghanistan. There was a 10 to 50 percent chance that
Iraq had been involved in 9/11, he argued, concluding that Saddam's "brittle, oppressive regime" might succumb easily to an
American attack--in contrast to the difficulties involved in prosecuting war in the mountains of Afghanistan.
Sec. of State Powell objects and the discussion moves back to Bin Laden. Bush indicated that he supported Powell's argument.
During the lunch break, the president sent a message to Wolfowitz and the other neocons, indicating that he did not wish to hear
any more about Iraq that day. But according to Richard Perle, Wolfowitz had planted a seed. Bush told Perle at Camp David that
once Afghanistan had been dealt with, it would be Iraq's turn.
Wolfowitz will later recall in an interview with Vanity Fair: “On the surface of the debate it at least appeared to be about not
whether but when. There seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the disagreement was whether it should be
in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a debate about
tactics and timing, the president clearly came down on the side of Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a debate about strategy
and what the larger goal was, it is at least clear with 20/20 hindsight that the president came down on the side of the larger goal.”
"Vanity Fair" 5-2004
Sept 16: Second Day at Camp David there's more talk of Iraq
Wolfowitz argued (at the Camp David meeting) that the real source of all the trouble and terrorism was probably Hussein. The
terrorist attacks of Sept 11 created an opportunity to strike. Now, Rumsfeld asked again: "Is this the time to attack Iraq”?
Powell objected, arguing that U.S. allies would not support a strike on Iraq. ”If you get something pinning Sept 11 on Iraq, great”,
Powell is quoted as saying. But let's get Afghanistan now. If we do that, we will have increased our ability to go after Iraq -- if we
can prove Iraq had a role”.
Inter Press Services 7-16-03
Sept 16:Bush tells Rice that "We won't do Iraq now, but it's a question we will return to"
President Bush indicated to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that while he had to do Afghanistan first, he was also
determined to do something about Saddam Hussein.
”There's some pressure to go after Saddam Hussein. Don Rumsfeld has said, ‘This is an opportunity to take out Saddam Hussein,
perhaps. We should consider it.’ And the president says to Condi Rice meeting head to head, ‘We won't do Iraq now.’ But it is a
question we're gonna have to return to,’” says Woodward
CBS -60 Min, 4-18-04
Sept 17: Bush authorizes Pentagon to begin plans for Iraq war
Six days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush signed a 2½-page document marked "TOP
SECRET" that outlined the plan for going to war in Afghanistan as part of a global campaign against terrorism.
Almost as a footnote, the document also directed the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq, senior
administration officials said....
The Pentagon, while it was fighting the war in Afghanistan, began reviewing its plans for Iraq because of the secret presidential
directive. Washington Post 1-12-03
Sept 18: Wolfowitz and Feith refine their arguments for Iraq War
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith argue in three memos why Iraq should be
included as a target in the war on terrorism. One memo, “Were We Asleep?,” is dated September 18, and suggests links between
Iraq and al-Qaeda. Mirror UK 9-22-03, Washington Post 1-12-03
Sept 18: Clarkes office reports no compelling case linking Iraq to Al Qaeda
Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke's office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled "Survey of Intelligence Information
on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks."
Rice's chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al
Qaeda. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few
foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi
intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad
were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for
links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's
regime.
Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Lade on unconventional weapons
9-11 Commission Report 7-22-04
Sept.19 - 20 Defense Policy Board meets in secret for two days to discuss a US response to 9-11.Discussion
revolves around Iraq.
The Defense Policy Board, headed by Richard Perle, begins two days of meetings on Sept.19. Founded a month earlier, some
members of the 18-member board included:
Also in attendance were Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Ahmed Chalabi, Chalabi's aide and Rendon Group
employee; Francis Brooke and Prof. Bernard Lewis. Meeting in secrecy in Rumsfeld's Pentagon conference room for nineteen hours
they discussed the option of taking military action against Iraq They also discuss how they might overcome some of the diplomatic
and political pressures that would likely attempt to impede a policy of regime change in Iraq.
After a C.I.A. briefing on the 9/11 attacks, Perle introduced two guest speakers; Princeton professor Bernard Lewis and Ahmed
Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress. Lewis said that America must respond to 9/11 with a show of strength: to do
otherwise would be taken in the Islamic world as a sign of weakness--one it would be bound to exploit. At the same time, he said,
America should support democratic reformers in the Middle East., “such as my friend here, Ahmed Chalabi.” Chalabi argues that
Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists and asserts that Saddam's regime has weapons of mass destruction. He also asserts “there'd
be no resistance, no guerrilla warfare from the Baathists, and [it would be] a quick matter of establishing a government.” Attendees
write a letter to President Bush calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein. “[E]ven if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the
attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam
Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war
on international terrorism,” the letter reads.
("The Path to War", Vanity Fair, 5-2004) ("The Manipulator", The New Yorker,5-29-04) (“Some Pentagon officials and advisors seek to
oust Iraq’s leader in war’s next phase.” New York Times 10-12-01)
Sept 20: Douglas Feith suggests that US attack a "non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq"
According to a footnote in the 9/11 Commission Report an unsigned top-secret memo, which the panel's report said appears to
have been written by Defense Under Secretary Douglas Feith, is one of several Pentagon documents uncovered by the commission
which advance unorthodox ideas for the war on terror. The memo suggested "hitting targets outside the Middle East in the initial
offensive" or a "non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq," The content of Feith's memo is thought to derive from the work of the Counter
Terrorism Evaluation Group, a two-man secret Pentagon intelligence unit appointed by Feith after 9/11, headed by Michael Maloof
and David Wurmser.
9-11 Commission Report
Washington Post 08-07-04
Sept 20: PNAC publishes letter to Bush calling for Iraq regime change even if no ties to 9-11 found
People for a New American Century Members publish a copy of the letter drafted by Perle during the meeting of the Defense
Policy Board in the Washington Times. The letter states: "It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to
the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the
eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”
PNAC Letter to President Bush, 9-20-2001
Sept. 20: Bush and Blair discuss regime change in Iraq
British Prime Minister Tony Blair meets with President George Bush at the White House. During the dinner that night, also attended
by Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and British ambassador Sir Christopher Meyer, Blair told Bush he should not get distracted from
the war on terror's initial goal - dealing with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Meyer claims Bush replied by saying: 'I agree with you, Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan,
we must come back to Iraq.' Regime change was already US policy.
It was clear, Meyer says, 'that when we did come back to Iraq it wouldn't be to discuss smarter sanctions'. The Guardian, 4-4-04
Sept 25: Justice Department secret memo approves legality of pre-emptive war
In a secret 15-page memo to Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, Justice Department lawyer John Yoo reasons that it is
“beyond question that the president has the plenary constitutional power to take such military actions as he deems necessary and
appropriate to respond to the terrorist attacks” of 9/11.
In a footnote that explained why such broad war-making authority was needed, the memo argued that terrorist groups and their
state sponsors “operate by secrecy and concealment” and it is therefore difficult to establish, by the standards of criminal
law, what groups are behind particular terrorist attacks. Moreover, “it may be impossible” for the president to disclose such
evidence even if he has it without compromising classified methods and sources.
The memo concludes that this should not in any way restrict the president from ordering whatever military actions “in his best
judgment” he believes are necessary to protect the country. In the exercise of his power to use military force, “the president’
s decisions are for him alone and are unreviewable.”
JOHN C. YOO Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel 9-25-2001
"I expected to go back to a round of meetings [after September 11] examining what the next attacks could be, what our
vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq. At
first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting Al Qaeda. Then I realized with almost a sharp
physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda
about Iraq." “They were talking about Iraq on 9/11. They were talking about it on 9/12.” "Against all Enemies" pg 30 , Richard
Clarke 3-1-04
Sept 12: NSC Meeting centers around Iraq invasion
Powell agrees with Clarke that the immediate focus should be al-Qaeda. However, Powell also says, “Public opinion has to be
prepared before a move against Iraq is possible.” Clarke complains to him, “Having been attacked by al-Qaeda, for us now to go
bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.” President Bush notes
the goal should be replacing the Iraqi government, not just bombing it, but the military warns an invasion would need a large force
and many months to assemble. Rumsfeld's view is said to be closely aligned with that of his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who believes
Saddam, not Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda, should be the principal target of the “war on terrorism.”
"Bush at War" Bob Woodward,pg 49 2002
"Against all Enemies" pg 31 Richard Clark 3-1-04
Sept 12: Rumsfeld says Iraq is better "target" than Afghanistan
During the NSC meeting the topic if Afghanistan is discussed. "Secretary Rumsfeld complained that there were no decent targets
for bombing in Afghanistan and that we should consider bombing Iraq, which, he said, had better targets."
"Against all Enemies" pg 31 Richard Clark 3-1-04
Sept 12: Bush tells Clarke to go back and look again for Iraq link to attacks
"On September 12th, I left the video conferencing center and there, wandering alone around the situation room, was the
president. He looked like he wanted something to do. He grabbed a few of us and closed the door to the conference room.
"Look," he told us, "I know you have a lot to do and all, but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything.
See if Saddam did this. See if he's linked in any way."
I was once again taken aback, incredulous, and it showed. "But, Mr. President, Al Qaeda did this."
"I know, I know, but - see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred..."
"Against all Enemies" pg 30 , Richard Clarke 3-1-04
Sept 13: Ex-CIA Chief, and leading Neocon, James Woolsly publishes op-ed calling for an examination into Iraqi
ties to both 9-11 and 1993 WTC bombings
"If this theory is correct, he says, “then it was Iraq that went after the World Trade Center last time. Which makes it much more
plausible that Iraq has done so again.” In light of this, he argues, US authorities should consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein
had a hand in the 9/11 attacks. “[I]intelligence and law enforcement officials investigating the case would do well to at least
consider another possibility: that the attacks—whether perpetrated by bin Laden and his associates or by others—were sponsored,
supported, and perhaps even ordered by Saddam Hussein,” he writes. “As yet, there is no evidence of explicit state sponsorship of
the September 11 attacks. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” "New Republic" 9-13-2001, "Daily Telegraph" 9-17-01
Sept 15: At Camp David Meeting Wolfowitz lobbies for war with Iraq
Saturday, September 15, President Bush gathered his closest advisers at Camp David to discuss the shape of the coming war. Much
of their discussion dealt with Afghanistan. But during a session that morning, according to Bob Woodward's 2002 book, Bush at War,
Wolfowitz advocated an attack on Iraq, perhaps even before an attack on Afghanistan. There was a 10 to 50 percent chance that
Iraq had been involved in 9/11, he argued, concluding that Saddam's "brittle, oppressive regime" might succumb easily to an
American attack--in contrast to the difficulties involved in prosecuting war in the mountains of Afghanistan.
Sec. of State Powell objects and the discussion moves back to Bin Laden. Bush indicated that he supported Powell's argument.
During the lunch break, the president sent a message to Wolfowitz and the other neocons, indicating that he did not wish to hear
any more about Iraq that day. But according to Richard Perle, Wolfowitz had planted a seed. Bush told Perle at Camp David that
once Afghanistan had been dealt with, it would be Iraq's turn.
Wolfowitz will later recall in an interview with Vanity Fair: “On the surface of the debate it at least appeared to be about not
whether but when. There seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the disagreement was whether it should be
in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a debate about
tactics and timing, the president clearly came down on the side of Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a debate about strategy
and what the larger goal was, it is at least clear with 20/20 hindsight that the president came down on the side of the larger goal.”
"Vanity Fair" 5-2004
Sept 16: Second Day at Camp David there's more talk of Iraq
Wolfowitz argued (at the Camp David meeting) that the real source of all the trouble and terrorism was probably Hussein. The
terrorist attacks of Sept 11 created an opportunity to strike. Now, Rumsfeld asked again: "Is this the time to attack Iraq”?
Powell objected, arguing that U.S. allies would not support a strike on Iraq. ”If you get something pinning Sept 11 on Iraq, great”,
Powell is quoted as saying. But let's get Afghanistan now. If we do that, we will have increased our ability to go after Iraq -- if we
can prove Iraq had a role”.
Inter Press Services 7-16-03
Sept 16:Bush tells Rice that "We won't do Iraq now, but it's a question we will return to"
President Bush indicated to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that while he had to do Afghanistan first, he was also
determined to do something about Saddam Hussein.
”There's some pressure to go after Saddam Hussein. Don Rumsfeld has said, ‘This is an opportunity to take out Saddam Hussein,
perhaps. We should consider it.’ And the president says to Condi Rice meeting head to head, ‘We won't do Iraq now.’ But it is a
question we're gonna have to return to,’” says Woodward
CBS -60 Min, 4-18-04
Sept 17: Bush authorizes Pentagon to begin plans for Iraq war
Six days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush signed a 2½-page document marked "TOP
SECRET" that outlined the plan for going to war in Afghanistan as part of a global campaign against terrorism.
Almost as a footnote, the document also directed the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq, senior
administration officials said....
The Pentagon, while it was fighting the war in Afghanistan, began reviewing its plans for Iraq because of the secret presidential
directive. Washington Post 1-12-03
Sept 18: Wolfowitz and Feith refine their arguments for Iraq War
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith argue in three memos why Iraq should be
included as a target in the war on terrorism. One memo, “Were We Asleep?,” is dated September 18, and suggests links between
Iraq and al-Qaeda. Mirror UK 9-22-03, Washington Post 1-12-03
Sept 18: Clarkes office reports no compelling case linking Iraq to Al Qaeda
Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke's office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled "Survey of Intelligence Information
on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks."
Rice's chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al
Qaeda. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few
foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi
intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad
were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for
links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's
regime.
Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Lade on unconventional weapons
9-11 Commission Report 7-22-04
Sept.19 - 20 Defense Policy Board meets in secret for two days to discuss a US response to 9-11.Discussion
revolves around Iraq.
The Defense Policy Board, headed by Richard Perle, begins two days of meetings on Sept.19. Founded a month earlier, some
members of the 18-member board included:
- Harold Brown, President Jimmy Carter's defense secretary
- Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
- R. James Woolsey, director of central intelligence in the Clinton administration
- Adm. David E. Jeremiah, the former deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Former Vice President Dan Quayle
- James R. Schlesinger a former defense and energy secretary
- Former Speaker of the House Newt Ginrich
- PNAC founder Eliot Cohen
- Richard Allen former Reagan National Security Advisor
Also in attendance were Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Ahmed Chalabi, Chalabi's aide and Rendon Group
employee; Francis Brooke and Prof. Bernard Lewis. Meeting in secrecy in Rumsfeld's Pentagon conference room for nineteen hours
they discussed the option of taking military action against Iraq They also discuss how they might overcome some of the diplomatic
and political pressures that would likely attempt to impede a policy of regime change in Iraq.
After a C.I.A. briefing on the 9/11 attacks, Perle introduced two guest speakers; Princeton professor Bernard Lewis and Ahmed
Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress. Lewis said that America must respond to 9/11 with a show of strength: to do
otherwise would be taken in the Islamic world as a sign of weakness--one it would be bound to exploit. At the same time, he said,
America should support democratic reformers in the Middle East., “such as my friend here, Ahmed Chalabi.” Chalabi argues that
Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists and asserts that Saddam's regime has weapons of mass destruction. He also asserts “there'd
be no resistance, no guerrilla warfare from the Baathists, and [it would be] a quick matter of establishing a government.” Attendees
write a letter to President Bush calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein. “[E]ven if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the
attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam
Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war
on international terrorism,” the letter reads.
("The Path to War", Vanity Fair, 5-2004) ("The Manipulator", The New Yorker,5-29-04) (“Some Pentagon officials and advisors seek to
oust Iraq’s leader in war’s next phase.” New York Times 10-12-01)
Sept 20: Douglas Feith suggests that US attack a "non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq"
According to a footnote in the 9/11 Commission Report an unsigned top-secret memo, which the panel's report said appears to
have been written by Defense Under Secretary Douglas Feith, is one of several Pentagon documents uncovered by the commission
which advance unorthodox ideas for the war on terror. The memo suggested "hitting targets outside the Middle East in the initial
offensive" or a "non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq," The content of Feith's memo is thought to derive from the work of the Counter
Terrorism Evaluation Group, a two-man secret Pentagon intelligence unit appointed by Feith after 9/11, headed by Michael Maloof
and David Wurmser.
9-11 Commission Report
Washington Post 08-07-04
Sept 20: PNAC publishes letter to Bush calling for Iraq regime change even if no ties to 9-11 found
People for a New American Century Members publish a copy of the letter drafted by Perle during the meeting of the Defense
Policy Board in the Washington Times. The letter states: "It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to
the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the
eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”
PNAC Letter to President Bush, 9-20-2001
Sept. 20: Bush and Blair discuss regime change in Iraq
British Prime Minister Tony Blair meets with President George Bush at the White House. During the dinner that night, also attended
by Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and British ambassador Sir Christopher Meyer, Blair told Bush he should not get distracted from
the war on terror's initial goal - dealing with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Meyer claims Bush replied by saying: 'I agree with you, Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan,
we must come back to Iraq.' Regime change was already US policy.
It was clear, Meyer says, 'that when we did come back to Iraq it wouldn't be to discuss smarter sanctions'. The Guardian, 4-4-04
Sept 25: Justice Department secret memo approves legality of pre-emptive war
In a secret 15-page memo to Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, Justice Department lawyer John Yoo reasons that it is
“beyond question that the president has the plenary constitutional power to take such military actions as he deems necessary and
appropriate to respond to the terrorist attacks” of 9/11.
- "Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups or
organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar
threat to the security of the United States and the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas."
In a footnote that explained why such broad war-making authority was needed, the memo argued that terrorist groups and their
state sponsors “operate by secrecy and concealment” and it is therefore difficult to establish, by the standards of criminal
law, what groups are behind particular terrorist attacks. Moreover, “it may be impossible” for the president to disclose such
evidence even if he has it without compromising classified methods and sources.
The memo concludes that this should not in any way restrict the president from ordering whatever military actions “in his best
judgment” he believes are necessary to protect the country. In the exercise of his power to use military force, “the president’
s decisions are for him alone and are unreviewable.”
JOHN C. YOO Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel 9-25-2001
September 11. There would be factional infighting among some of the key members of the Administration, but in the end the plans for regime change pushed by the Neocon insiders at the Pentagon would prevail. |
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| (1) Opening sequence of events from: Cooperative Research |
| © 2005 IraqFact Working Group |